

Christianity and Society

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by

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BOOK REVIEWS

WINTER 1951-1952

40 CENTS

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

Published by CHRISTIAN ACTION

This is the first issue of this quarterly under the newly-organized Christian Action. It marks a turning point in that it will reach a larger audience, will have a broader editorial base, and will be subject to the policies of Christian Action.

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Subscription Rate: \$1.50 per year; 40c per copy
6 Shillings per year in England
7 Shillings and Six Pence in Australia
Published Quarterly

Mrs. Nola Meade, Secretary, 3041 Broadway, N. Y. C. 27
English Agent: Donald M. Mathers, Annandale, North End Road,
London N.W. 11



CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

VOLUME 17

NUMBER I

EDITORIALS

Christian Action and the Layman

One of the hopes of our new organization "Christian Action" is to extend the scope of our studies and our common actions, beyond the clerical, to the lay circles of the church. There is unfortunately a wide hiatus between the social and ethical convictions of the clerical leaders of the Christian church and the lay leaders. Expressed in crude political terms, American lay Protestants are dominantly more Republican than the church. While there are clergymen who eagerly follow the promptings of a Fifiield or a Peale and content themselves with adding prayer and unction to the pronouncements of the N.A.M., they are not typical of American clergyman. The typical American clergyman is "liberal" in politics; has been influenced by various versions of the "social Gospel", frequently gives leadership to various causes of economic and racial justice and tries in various ways, with greater or less courage and with greater or less pedagogical skill, to penetrate through the armor of social complacency which characterizes the lay membership of his congregation, particularly in suburbia. Not infrequently a member of this board of elders will make him a pointed present of a copy of the *Readers Digest* with Dr. Peale's article on "Why Not Speak up for Capitalism?" and suggest that several sermons on the indicated theme would be in order. *The New Yorker* recently carried a cartoon which pictured the church situation

in a nutshell. The picture depicted a plush group of vestrymen counting piles of Sunday receipts in the vestry while one enthusiastic member exclaimed "The Rector's crack at the New Deal certainly paid off today".

There is, in short, a considerable difference between the church's official position on great social issues and the political position of its leading laymen. The "official" position of the churches in varying social creeds of the denominations, of the old Federal Council and of the World Council of Churches gives a clear warrant for the belief of the socially sensitive clergy that the Christian faith demands a responsible attitude toward the economic and political issues; and that justice is not achieved in any community by allowing the economic process simply to take its course. The American business community is, on the other hand, wedded to the theory that all the virtues of our society are rooted in a "market" economy.

While the Catholic church in America has a more organic relation to the labor movement than the Protestant churches, being less middle-class in sociological composition, it is nevertheless significant that something of the same contrast between the ethical-social theory of the church and that of its laymen appears in Catholicism also. The notoriety recently achieved by the book entitled *God and Man at Yale* is a case in point. The author of this book is a young

Catholic, son of a very wealthy Catholic business man. His attack upon Yale University was two-pronged. The teachings of the university were "Godless" on the one hand and "socialistic" on the other. Even the mildest forms of Keynesian doctrine were described as socialistic. The assumption underlying the whole indictment was that Christianity was wedded to *laissez faire* economics. The Jesuit weekly *America* quickly pointed out that this young Catholic had completely misapprehended Catholic social ethics. For Catholic theory insists that "the state has the moral authority to regulate economic life". The young man undoubtedly developed his social theories in a business community which, despite the Catholic faith of his home, had been influenced by Christian social theory as little as the average Protestant business community. The only difference appears to be that Catholic business men do not explicitly challenge the authority of their church to speak on these issues, or organize committees to inquire into the "purity" of the church's social doctrines. It is also questionable whether any Catholic business man would solicit funds for his church as one of the business leaders, active in the National Council of Churches, recently solicited his business friends, asking them for contributions to the National Council, on the ground that the "freedom of the market" is one side of the shield of democracy of which freedom of religion is the other.

Incidentally if the relations between Catholicism and Protestantism were not in such a woeful state of mutual suspicion something might be done to speak to the conscience of the nation with a single Christian voice on great social issues. For when Catholicism is not defending an old feudalism but relating itself to an industrial society; and when Protestantism ceases to be divided into two camps of a reactionary "liberalism" and a too simple Marxism, the two faiths arrive at remarkably similar conclusions on social issues. Catholic social theory as expounded by the National Catholic Welfare Council and Protestant theory as expounded by the National Council's

Commission on the Church and Economic Life are almost completely parallel. They have much more in common than either has with the regnant theories of the American business community.

The problem of bringing lay opinion into agreement with the conscience of the church is undoubtedly solved more easily in the Catholic, than in the Protestant Church. The Catholic portion of the problem is, in any event, not our concern. Our concern is with the Protestant social conscience. Everything possible must be done to extend our "Christian Action" beyond a small circle of "professional" Christian leaders.

Our purpose must be to reach the thoughtful Christian layman. We must reach not only those who require instruction; but also those who have a sensitive conscience on social issues but are isolated in their local Christian communities. We must forge a community inside the Christian community in which the social and economic issues of our day are approached with courage and with Christian insight.

R. N.

Superfluous Advice

The Christian Century took it upon itself, upon news of the founding of "Christian Action" to express some apprehension about the possibility of our being too "middle of the road". The ground for this apprehension was our critical attitude toward those on the "Christian left" who were "fellow-travellers" of the "party line". Evidently *The Christian Century* believes that every "liberal" organization must include some deluded people in order to be certain that it is sufficiently rigorous in opposing reaction.

The actual situation is that the moral confusion which prompted so many intellectuals and religious idealists to espouse, whether covertly or overtly, the cause of communism, not only contributed to the triumph of communism in some nations; but it also needlessly exposed the genuinely liberal movement to unnecessary

handicaps. It is to be taken for granted that anyone in America who criticises the status quo will be labelled a communist by the minions of reaction. But there is no reason why we should take measures to prove these charges to be true, by mixing a few fellow-travellers into our membership.

Everywhere in the world today the cause of democracy requires that a "middle-ground" be held between reaction and revolutionary communism. This middle ground is subject to attack from both right and left. The right insists that every critic of society is a communist. The communist left insists that everyone who does not march under the banners of Stalin is a reactionary. The actual policies of right and left frequently converge upon the center in a very ominous "united front." In France today the Gaullists and the communists are uniting to bring down the government of the "third force" in a pattern which is ominously reminiscent of a similar collaboration between Hitler and the German communists.

Our own situation in America is fortunately not as desperate. We do not have an exact counterpart of Gaullism; and communism is a negligible force. But the same struggle for a democratic middle ground must be waged among us on another level than in Germany or France.

The reason there is such a middle ground has been perfectly stated in the report on economic problems of the first General Assembly of the World Council of Churches. In that report it is asserted that pure capitalism promises justice as a by-product of economic freedom while communism promises freedom as a by-product of equalitarian collectivism; and that both promises have proved to be illusory. Real justice has to be found and developed in between these two illusions. We do not need a little of the one illusion to guard against the other one. Both illusions after all have something of the same root. In neither creed is there an understanding of the fact that when love is incorporated into law and

social institutions (which must be done though it can never be done perfectly) the freedom and the justice which are perfectly united only in that form of love which is above all law, tend to stand partly in contradiction to each other. For this reason democratic programs can not be too dogmatic. They must above all avoid panaceas. For in every panacea for the world's ills there lurks an illusion about the possibility of perfectly embodying the law of love into social institutions.

But freed from these illusions we have every possibility of perfecting the justice of social institutions. The middle ground must not be a dead center. It must not be dominated by defensive fears toward the right and the communist left. It must move forward, recognizing that there are indeterminate possibilities in every historic situation to eliminate the dominion of one group over another; to prevent the unjust distribution of the common fund of the community; to mitigate the sin of pride and arrogance which majorities tend to have toward minorities, whether ethnic, religious or economic; and to provide a better framework for the cooperation of men in common tasks.

R. N.

The American Position in the World

Though we may achieve an armistice or at least a cease-fire in Korea, it must be admitted that the prestige of America has fallen in recent months in both Europe and America. In some respects it has fallen catastrophically. Some of the reasons for this situation are:

(a) The rearmament program in Europe has had deleterious effects upon the gradually reviving European economies. The rising prices, partly caused by our stockpiling of strategic materials, have been particularly burdensome to the working people of Europe. We are held responsible for this result, though the fault is not altogether ours. In France a socialist leader recently declared: "If we continue the armaments race at the price of making the European workers desperate we will put guns

into the hands of people who can not be trusted to use them on our side". He was, of course, speaking out of the French situation, where inflation is particularly grievous and where the communist movement is still understandably large. The fact is that France is not at all a safe bastion. It is a place where communism could still overleap the strategic military defenses.

(b) Our agreement with Franco's government has lowered our moral prestige in Britain and France particularly but also in the whole of western Europe.

(c) We are still widely suspected of not trying assiduously enough to avoid a war. We are believed to be so anxious to win the war, should it break out, that we increase the hazards of its outbreak. Some of this criticism emanates from France, which is so conscious of the fact that a war would catapult that nation into civil conflict, that the resulting "neutralism" is certainly as far from wisdom as the heedlessness of some of our strategists. Incidentally "neutralism" is gaining wide support in Japan also, where there is strong opposition, not so much to the peace treaty as to the subsequent treaty establishing our military alliance with Japan.

(d) Most European, as well as Asian, nations still believe that communist China ought to be admitted into the United Nations as a part of a general peace settlement. Our administration seems to have paid a considerable price for the moral defeat of MacArthur. That price was an intransigent and inflexible policy on the question of China's admission to the United Nations. The whole public temper of America is so hysterical upon this point that when Justice William Douglas recently suggested the necessity of reconsidering this issue he was pilloried in almost every American journal.

(e) There is a general fear that we may begin the use of "strategic" atomic weapons and thus open the flood-gates to an atomic war. This fear has been accentuated by statements by Mr. Dean, the head of our Atomic Energy Commission and by Gen-

eral Eisenhower. There is a rumor that one of the purposes of Mr. Churchill's trip to Washington is to exact a promise that British air bases will not be used without the full consent of the British government for the specific uses to which they may be put. Mr. Churchill declared in his Mansion House speech that Britain "had every need and every right to receive the fullest consideration from Americans for our point of view". That guarded criticism from a traditional friend is a nice indication of the general apprehensions about us in Europe.

These hazards of American leadership in the world community are not recounted to discourage. They do prove how important it is for a nation so powerful as ours "to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly before God". It is the quality of humility which is lacking most. That is the perpetual problem of all powerful men and nations. If the Christian churches are to be a leaven within, and a conscience to, this nation, let them help this great collective giant to recognize the temptations to vain-glory under which this nation lives; and the perils of the blindness which such vanity creates. Our newspapers are filled with self-congratulation. Even the most thoughtful of them do not engage in thoughtful discussions about foreign policy. This pride-induced stupidity and inflexibility is the most serious hazard to peace today.

R. N.

Notes on Current Events

The proposed appointment to the Vatican is undoubtedly unnecessary. But in what sense does it violate the American traditions of the separation of church and state? Does it change anything in the internal structure of the American community?

We have reason to be concerned with the growing political power of Catholicism, when that power is used to secure advantages of prestige for one church. But why didn't the Protestant churches of America protest against our negotiations with Franco? In that case Catholic pressure was

more detrimental to our cause than the Vatican appointment. The effect of our Franco deal upon democratic opinion in Britain, and France and the whole of western Europe was catastrophic.

The Franco deal would not have been made if pressure from the navy had not been combined with Catholic pressure. The Vatican appointment proposal grew out of a concurrence of pressures from Army intelligence and the church. There is a possibility that the Vatican was more anxious for the appointment than local Catholics. Some local Catholics regard it as a threat to the freedom of the church in America.

The inflationary movement continues. Prices go up and the escalator clauses in union contracts automatically send up wages. Where there are no escalator clauses new contracts for higher wages are signed. The new tax law is not sufficient to remove the inflationary pressure. The price control measures are equally inadequate. Nobody seems really concerned to stop inflation. Could it be that we have reached a new kind of "class struggle" in which organized labor and business have an unconscious agreement not to worry about inflation? Or rather they have their own reasons for not worrying too much about an inflationary spiral which they have the power to ride. The real "class" victims are all people on fixed incomes. This middle class is being destroyed. Continued inflation may have some very serious cultural consequences if one considers the professional contributions to our cultural life of the fixed income group.

What are the poor politicians to do? The polls show that Truman can defeat Taft but that Eisenhower can defeat Truman. The Republican professionals would like to nominate Taft but they are also very hungry after twenty years in the wilderness. Therefore the pressure for Eisenhower's nomination will continue and can be

stopped only by him. Meanwhile Truman will have to watch the proceedings very carefully. For he can not decline the nomination after the Republican convention nominates Eisenhower. That would look like cowardice. He must come to a conclusion about whether Eisenhower or Taft will be his opponent long before that. Therefore if Truman declines to run some time this winter, you can be fairly certain that Eisenhower will be the Republican nominee, or at least that a shrewd forecaster by the name of Truman has made that guess. These are the "contingent factors" upon which the fate of civilizations might hinge.

Churchill's election in Britain may have a salutary effect upon international relations. He is anxious to win the "last great prize" of securing a better peace. No one can suspect him of being an appeaser nor yet of being a "socialist" cousin of communism. Therefore if he finds a way of cooling off the hot war, his lead will be taken seriously in Washington. Incidentally the suspicion in Europe of American policy and the general feeling that we are so anxious to win a possible war, that we do not try hard enough to avoid it, is not confined to the "left". It runs through all circles of European society. It isn't altogether fair; but neither is it completely without cause.

The general deterioration of standards of honesty in this nation continues. The Federal service seems shot through with graft, though not of the proportions of the Harding era. The corruption of youth by gamblers in sport, particularly in basketball is also more widespread than at first believed. Even more ominous is the cynicism with which some of the high school students view this situation. They seem to believe that the offenders were primarily guilty of being caught in doing something which they profess everyone is trying to do.

Everyone is talking about how to inculcate "standards" of honesty. Perhaps we

might take a lesson from St. Paul on the one hand and from Max Weber on the other. St. Paul believed that moral preaching as such did not solve a moral problem: "Thou preachest a man should not steal? Doest thou not steal?" Max Weber sought to prove that the standards of honesty which made modern technical society possible was established by the religious ex-

perience of the Reformation, according to which each individual felt himself responsible to God for his conduct, without intervention of any intermediary, whether of secular community or church. Is it not significant that society could not possibly have enough police and detectives to enforce standards of honesty if there is not an inner religious discipline in life? R. N.

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CHRISTIAN ACTION: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

By JOHN W. TURNBULL

Christian Action, the new interdenominational Protestant social action group which was formed in Washington in September and which now publishes this journal, has moved into the beginning stages of its formal organization and work.

On October 27-28, the Executive Council elected at Washington held its first meeting in New York. Besides discussing the general aims and program of the organization, about which more will be said later, the group took several significant steps toward the consolidation of the movement and the setting up of organizational structures for future action. Among these may be mentioned the following:

Reinhold Niebuhr, Dean of the Faculty at Union Theological Seminary, and Liston Pope, Dean of the Divinity School of Yale University, were elected co-chairmen of the Executive Council. Walter Muelder, Dean of the Boston University School of Theology, was added to the Executive Council as its nineteenth member. Four major committees were organized, their chairmen appointed, and their responsibilities discussed. They are as follows: Administrative Committee, chairman Robert T. Handy, Assistant Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary and Chairman of the Provisional Committee of Christian Action. Resource and Emphasis Committee, chairman Kenneth W. Underwood, Assistant Professor of Social Ethics in Yale University Divinity School. Editorial and Publications Committee, chairman M. Moran Weston, Assistant Secretary in the Department of Christian Social Relations, National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Finance Committee, chairman Charles S. McCoy, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Committee of Christian Action.

The writer of this article was hired by the Executive Council as full-time Executive Secretary of Christian Action, and has been at work since November first in the new national office in New York.

Bridging the Gaps

Prominent in the thinking of the Executive Council were two convictions about the charge laid upon Christian Action, which might be expressed by saying that there are two gaps in Protestant social action which Christian Action will try to bridge.

The first of these gaps is that between theoretical political, economic, and social analysis on the one hand and specific action projects on the other. All too often Protestants with burning social concern have engaged in sporadic and uninformed crusades to set right single social wrongs, while the students of the social sciences have gone about their academic discussion among themselves without making their insights available to the layman. As a result, social action has been less effective than it might have been because it has not seen particular issues as related to broad problems of social structure; and learned social analysis has been meaningless because it has not been related to specific areas of social justice. Christian Action hopes to bring together the wisdom of the scholar and the enthusiasm of the reformer, providing the latter with a secure theoretical foundation for action, and providing the former with a concrete sphere for the application of his knowledge. Thus Christian Action will attempt to move through specific social concerns to the development of comprehensive and integrated social policy. In this way we hope to set every concrete social action project within the framework of a total

social policy, and to work toward the development of that policy through the consideration of the whole array of particular issues.

The second gap is related to the first. It is the gap in communication which often exists between the national offices of large organizations and their local, "grass-roots" groups. All too frequently, membership in a national organization becomes simply a matter of holding a membership card and glancing at occasional publications in the development of whose policies the individual member has no part. Thus the role of the individual member often becomes simply that of accepting verbally a kind of "line" which the national group offers. In his dealing with social problems in his own community, the individual member generally finds that the pronouncements of the national office are of very little help, since they deal in generalities which he does not altogether understand and which he would not know how to apply if he did. Thus the individual is forced to go his own way, and it becomes very difficult for his own thought and action to be related to the policy of the group as a whole. In Christian Action we are deeply concerned about maintaining two-way communication between local groups and the national office. The national office will act as a sort of liaison agency among the local groups, a channel for the exchange and development of ideas and programs. Thus it is hoped that the insights and problems of all can be shared by the group as a whole. Each local group will be a truly active cell, existing in a double relation on the one hand to the rest of the movement through the national office and on the other hand to the sphere of social concern with which it is dealing. In this way the influence of the thought and action of each member and each group within the movement can be multiplied many times, and really effective and influential action instituted.

In these ways Christian Action hopes to implement its basic concern for the awakening of Protestantism to an informed par-

ticipation in the political and economic life of the nation, a participation in which the ethical principles of the Christian faith can effectively be brought to bear upon contemporary society.

This is an ambitious undertaking which Christian Action has laid out for itself. In this undertaking the members have been profoundly aware of the responsibility laid upon them by God for taking a part in the healing of the deep-seated social ills in our world. They have also sensed clearly their incapacity for dealing with those ills apart from their continued reliance upon divine guidance. Members of Christian Action have been urged to pray regularly that God may bless and strengthen the group's endeavors when they are performed according to his purposes, and that he may turn them aside when they fall into error. For a movement of this sort there can be no measure of success apart from the grace of God given in Jesus Christ. This conviction must stand not simply as a traditional verbal affirmation of the kind which is generally appended to every public pronouncement, but as the vital center of the whole of the life of Christian Action.

What Is Ahead

A couple of specific projects are in the immediate offing. The first is the preparation and publication of a handbook for local Christian Action groups, offering them suggestions for organization and action. This handbook will help to clarify our own thinking about Christian Action, and to provide a starting-point for local organization.

The second is a financial campaign. Like every organization, Christian Action needs money in order to carry out its program. The generosity of a large number of people during the formative period of Christian Action and the wide response to the appeal for members since its organization have given us a sufficient backlog of funds to carry us through for a time. But we need to have a systematic, long-range financial program ready to roll by early in 1952. The

Finance Committee is at work on developing such a program.

Meanwhile, we are working on the organization of our national office and of regional and local groups. In California, in Illinois, in Pennsylvania, and in New York such organizations are already beginning to get started. In many other places people are waiting for further help from us

so that they can get under way. We are trying to move as fast as is humanly possible without running the risk of overreaching our present capacities.

We earnestly solicit your comments, suggestions, and reactions with regard to all of these matters. Address the Executive Secretary, 537 West 121st Street, New York 27, New York.

PRAYER FOR CHRISTIAN ACTION

"Almighty God, may Thy justice and peace be established among all men and nations. So guide and direct our Action that Thy will may be done through us. Endow us with the will and courage fearlessly to seek Thy Kingdom, and fill our hearts with Thy love and grace that we draw others unto Thee and turn none away; through Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen."

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL SCIENCE

By EDUARD HEIMANN

In last year's report the Carnegie Corporation for the Promotion of Science deplores the backwardness of the social sciences vis-a-vis the high degree of perfection attained by the physical sciences and blames the sorry state of the former for the international tension and apprehension. Atomic scientists have frequently vented similar sentiments. The admiration, awe, and worship in which the natural sciences are being held is most curiously illumined by the fact that the likeness in stone of Albert Einstein can be seen among the saints and martyrs of the faith over the entrance to the Riverside Church. Indeed, it is the sciences by which modern mankind expects to be saved from its ills and forebodings, as former ages expected their salvation to come from the power worshipped in religion.

Is it permissible, in such an intellectual climate, to express some rather heretical ideas? To say that in this world, which hopes for salvation through rationalization of individual and social life, science itself has gone completely irrational?

Reason incorporated in science was supposed to shed its light into the dark corners of our existence, ferret out what cannot stand up to the light and clean and clear up what is damp and dusty. Reason and science were supposed to be the truly human force in man, that through which he rises, on the one hand, above the unreasoning animals and emancipates himself, on the other hand, from inscrutable forces of doom and grace superior to him; that through which he becomes autonomous, his own master.

Instead, it is science itself which has become autonomous, that is, has emancipated itself from man and has embarked on a course of development increasingly heedless of human reason. One may say:

increasingly unintelligible to man. The great scientists figure out formulas and apply them but understand them as little as the layman, if understanding means in any sense appropriation by living man rather than mechanical production and reproduction of magic figures. The scientists find themselves in the tragic position of being enslaved to the products of their mind, which they hate and denounce but cannot stop, like Goethe's Sorcerer's Apprentice. "Herr, die Not ist gross."

It is not true that this development could not have been foreseen. A man wiser than Einstein has foreseen it four centuries ago. Leonardo da Vinci, whom the world reveres, along with one or two others, as its greatest genius in art, knew how to fly and navigate under water but destroyed the traces of his knowledge lest mankind be tempted by its reckless lusts to use them for its self-destruction. Leonardo was far from being an orthodox Christian; he was one of the earliest believers in reason. But he still breathed an air which was saturated with the insight into the ambivalence and moral frailty of man's mind; he knew that knowledge must not be proclaimed supreme and left unguided because it may be abused by lusts. The Nazis made systematic scientific experiments on the behavior of people under torture—no objection is possible if knowledge is good in itself, and such studies may quite possibly yield instructive results in psychology and physiology.

Atomic science now has taught man how to blow up the world. In search for the key to the mystery of creation we have hit upon destruction. The scientific difference between the two is small, they are essentially one. God layed the foundation of the world by transforming his creative energy into substance; we transform substance back into blind energy. But we know

as little as ever of the mystery of creation, which is to make something formed and alive of nothing, of empty energy; we make nothing of something, although the scientific law of "preservation of energy" certainly holds in this case, too. To science, unmaking is as worth studying as making; unfortunately it is easier.

There was a time when people knew that a great student of nature or medicine or history or the law did not only know facts but possessed insights and wisdom which lifted him over ordinary men to a dignity all his own, despite the personal vanity which often accompanied it, as a tribute of a great mind to human smallness. Insights and wisdom are not born into man; they grow and mature in him and with him through his work. And the work does not mature without the marks of suffering and defeat on it; a Christian knows that there is no other way to understanding. But no wisdom, no maturity, no personal growth is required for scientific greatness today; one either is a great physicist at 23, endowed by nature with the extraordinary brain power which this requires, or one will never become a great physicist. The scientist as such is a man of power without responsibility. As a scientist he disclaims responsibility for his knowledge, which he regards as morally indifferent. Nay, human presumption has taught him to believe that his knowledge, the power of his mind will liberate man from his ills. The biblical legend (Isaiah 14:2) has it that God's most beautiful angel, Lucifer, the "Bringer of Light", as he set himself up as God, was thrown into the underworld to reign over the forces of destruction.

The scientists are anything but immoral people personally; the cries of despair with which they accompany what their science forces them to discover testify to the opposite. What is immoral is their science. It is immoral programmatically since it does not care to be moral, pretending instead that it is knowledge which is truly moral and makes man moral. The presumption of man's scientific mind overrules the moral

"inhibitions" of its ministers and makes them unwilling servants of doom; they take their revenge by becoming, as private persons, prophets of doom.

In this situation the social sciences are grotesquely harangued with the exhortation to speed up their development along the lines so triumphantly trodden by the natural sciences. Scientific morality will make us good, not by a moral effort, an effort of the whole person and his will, still less by a religious effort, a rededication and regeneration, but by a mere intellectual effort, the training of the mind, which does not hurt. It is as easy as that.

For the social sciences to imitate the natural sciences in order to share their painless triumphs means to become immoral programmatically, to declare themselves above moral responsibility in the name of scientific truth, which must be followed wherever it may lead. This program has been well under way for several generations. Its immediate beneficiaries are the dictators and would-be dictators, whom it provides with the scientific means to standardize and control people's behavior. Scientific democrats retort that this is due solely to a regrettable lag of democracy in exploring and using the means of specifically democratic control; their ambition is to give us, if the phrase is permitted, "scientific freedom". "Scientific", it should be remembered, means "strictly prescribed". Our "freedom" would thus be controlled by professors, or rather by those who employ and control the professors. Immature knowledge ends in absurdity.

There seems to be an explanation, if no excuse, for the indifference to morality of the natural sciences. Uranium is morally indifferent, although it does not follow at all that man's knowledge of uranium is morally indifferent. In the case of the social sciences, however, the subject matter itself, society, is not morally indifferent; it must be either moral or immoral or both. If society were moral we would not need to worry, that is, to study the social sciences. If society were simply immoral, it would not, or no longer, exist.

The truth is that society is always suspended between morality and immorality, living on its residue of the former and threatened in its very existence by the latter. A social science which ignores the social and historical relevance of the moral problem can teach us many things of a technical nature, which are worth knowing and using, but nothing fundamental.

This is a gross understatement, however. If it is true that men and groups of men are naturally and inevitably competitors and cooperators at the same time, and not only for material goods; that natural interests, consequently, make them both allies and enemies; that the durability of society, hence, is dependent on something more fundamental and higher than natural interests, on a spiritual tie binding men and groups of men into spontaneous association, most of all in democracy—then to ignore the moral element in society is not morally indifferent; it is strictly immoral because it helps to destroy society by inculcating in the student the idea that society can live without morality. And this is precisely what the admirers of the natural sciences recommend to the social sciences to do.

But is not the moral, the spiritual, strictly unscientific? Is it not objectively unreal, purely subjective and arbitrary? Is not the real that which is tangible and measurable alone, such as the natural interest? Do we not, then, recommend to the social sciences an unscientific method?

That the spiritual is unreal is one of the dogmatic assumptions on which the prevailing conception of science rests. It is a dogma; science cannot even try to prove it. The simple fact is that science chooses to ignore the spiritual because it lies outside the area covered by its chosen method,

and then proceeds to declare non-existent that which it chooses to ignore. Some of the most radical philosophers of the scientific method, the Logical Positivists, have drawn the honest conclusion that science cannot deny the logical possibility of there being things outside its reach.

Logical possibility, naturally, is not enough; the question is that of reality, of the spiritual being real. That it is has been suggested above by what claims to be a bit of strict scientific reasoning. If the natural interest draws people sometimes toward one another and makes them associates, but at other times pits man against man as competitors and enemies, then cohesion, peace, and durability in the life of society depend on something more profound or higher than the whimsical natural interest; something by which man transcends the merely natural in him, his natural drives, and his natural reactions. A suggestion of this kind is a program of scientific study; the problem is that of the role of religion as the cohesive, constitutive force in society in both its constant and its changing commandments and practical conclusions. Bits of this program have already been realized by anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and theologians. But public opinion in the social sciences seems still to cling to the position that the spiritual may indeed be a necessary bond in primitive societies but is now being replaced by the accurate understanding of society which science alone can teach.

Is it not perhaps a test of the objective reality of the spiritual that, the more it declines because it is loudly argued away as an illusion and denounced as a superstition, the graver is, beyond all questions of political or economic forms or reforms, the threat to the survival of society?

A PROLEGOMENA TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN PACIFIST AND NON-PACI- FIST CHRISTIANS

By EDWARD LE ROY LONG, JR.

Genuine discussion between Christian pacifists and Christian non-pacifists has almost ceased to exist. We have agreed, in the main, to accept as satisfactory the assertion of the non-pacifists that pacifism has a valid witness in the church as a non-political leaven while non-pacifism represents the historically responsible position of those who understand the tragic and ambiguous nature of political decision. Furthermore, we have tacitly agreed to this definition of the ethical status quo despite the fact that modern warfare has radically changed since its first formulation. We are talking 1939 language about 1951 issues.

We need a new start—a start in which the insight concerning the ambiguity of political decision is not necessarily the private polemical ax of one side of the discussion, a start in which it is not simply assumed that modern warfare serves the cause of even precarious justice, a start in which pacifism is not simply regarded as the political extension of love.

A good place to start is with a discussion of weapons of mass destruction. Nowhere more sharply, and in a sense more profoundly, has the tragic context of ethical choice made itself felt than in the case of modern war using these weapons. To turn our backs upon the power struggles fought with such weapons is probably to commit our neighbors to tyranny. On the other hand to accept the use of such weapons is to partake of a struggle which by its very nature gives no promise of restraint, but rather every evidence of finally bringing mankind to total suicide. In facing this stark reality we know that we can make no humanly satisfying decisions in facing the problem of modern war. We will not

find an easy answer to the dilemmas which confront us.

About the new dimensions of war, its obvious contradiction of the commandments of Christ and the considerations of reason, the mushroomed awfulness of its methodology, and its frightful limitations as a means of justice, most thoughtful Christians are agreed. Even those Christians who accept full participation in modern war as the dire necessity of a given historical situation, do so with a full awareness (in so far as their decision is informed by the gospel insight) of the tragic character of their choice and with a sense of impotence to do other than to commit violence in a given situation. Theirs is a sensitivity to the moral issues commanding utmost respect, and it stands in noteworthy contrast to crass cultural jingoism. A genuine communication between this group and the pacifist group may not be impossible if both realize the sharp line which separates their level of decision and concern from that of the culture as a whole.

The distinctive Christian judgment about the ethical dilemmas posed by modern war is not one regarding political and military necessity; it is not a judgment seeking to categorically mark either participation or non-participation in war as "Christian." It is rather that insight, perhaps too subtle to be effectively conveyed to a secular culture in any wholesale sense, that no decision is possible regarding the ethics of modern war which will avoid the very tragic character of human choice. There is also the correlative insight that every decision in regard to ethical choices of such a tragic dimension is meaningless and futile apart from the grace of God in Christ. There is

no political answer to a supra-political dilemma, and every attempt to define such an answer will be regarded by the culture as either a blanket sanction for unrestrained war or as an irrelevant protest against it.

In this regard the action of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam proved more wise than it appeared at the time. It avoided the definition of Christian conscience in terms of specific political decision, and emphasized the fact that the will of God regarding participation in war by Christians is not understood with a common mind. It confessed its dismay at the inability of the church to reach a united voice on such an issue, but had it (especially at this juncture in history) reached such a united voice, it would have failed to underscore again the tragic character of our plight.

This is not to say that individual Christians may not take definite stands regarding the issues at hand—indeed it is to lay upon them a heavy (and in some sense unbearable) burden to choose individual actions under the grace of God. However, it is to say that a deeper level of concern must be manifest in Christian deliberations than the level of strict politics. The framework of the decisions, the humility which recognizes their fragmentary and provisional character, and the penitence that realizes in a tortured sense that we are all unprofitable servants—these are the factors which distinguish a distinctively Christian insight from a secular one.

Within this framework some word of interchange between those whose political analysis is pacifist and those whose analysis is not, may perhaps be spoken. We ought to remind ourselves that political analysis is not simply pragmatic in character, but commonly reflects the presuppositions with which it is made; analysis reflects underlying assumptions. In this case, the not uncommon assumption, (so much evidenced in the stalemate decried above) that non-pacifism is the historically responsible position in the modern world, may be brought to question. There is a judgment here we are not

free to regard as categorical. It is based upon an assumption about the nature of society—that it is mainly an interplay of power forces—just as time-bound and secular as the assumption which often backs pacifist thought, namely that the nature of society is cohesive social unity based on the “contract.” That the political analyses here are colored, one by Marx, the other by Rousseau, in no way makes either distinctively “Christian.”

Much of the inability of pacifists to communicate with non-pacifists lies in the failure of each to understand the close interconnection between underlying assumption and political analysis. The usual debates run somewhat along these lines: One side feels strongly that tyranny can only be stopped with force, or the threat of force; so obvious is this from within their presuppositions that those who believe otherwise can only appear as “sentimental” or as those “refusing to take history seriously.” The other side feels strongly that only creative good will can mitigate international distrust and strife; so clearly do they see this from within their set of assumptions that those who believe otherwise can only be “pessimists” or exponents of a “theology of despair.”

These smear words illumine the basic and perplexing problem which is analytical even more than communicative. Perhaps they are the words of two ideological extremes, albeit neither side (and especially the one claiming a pragmatic base most strongly) would regard its position as basically ideological. Pacifism is apt to be ideological in so far as it is perfectionistic; non-pacifism can likewise be ideological in so far as it refuses to acknowledge the possibility that refusal to use force might at times (and especially in times of mass murder warfare) be more politically realistic than wholesale suicide. Pacifism is ideological in so far as it seeks a too simple formula for the application of love to society, but non-pacifism is ideological in so far as it refuses to understand the function of creative law as a means to political justice.

Indeed, it may be that a truth can be found between the extremes—that we must come to realize that it is as much a false absolutism to suggest that willingness to use military power is a crucial measure of political responsibility as it is to suggest that refusal of its use is a critical measure of Christian love.

Pacifists and non-pacifists can certainly agree that the idea of a preventive war is unsound and unChristian. This is a basis for real discussion, not simply because pacifists will string along anyway, but rather because pacifists can witness with a unique historical relevance to this issue. The idea of "cold" war is something new under the sun—it cannot be conducted without an as yet unparalleled degree of moral reserve, and will not stay cold save as the restraints upon it are stronger than those which can spring from a military mentality. Furthermore, no break in a stand firm policy can come save by constant attempts to cut across the gulf that separates contending powers. This type of attempt, sometimes in foolish ways that non-pacifists can chastise, is apt to spring more from pacifist than from non-pacifist convictions. We ought somehow to reach an understanding which will accept the pacifist witness, not as a perfectionistic witness pointing to an absolute gospel norm, but as a concrete witness producing continuous caution in non-pacifist to refrain from the cynicism of accepting and dealing with world issues on a purely power basis. We are not tempted as a nation to irresponsible weakness (as we may have been in isolationist days) but to power arrogance and the irresponsible flouting of newly acquired prestige. Our major need now is not power, but great restraint over it. The pacifist witness, particularly if it can be stated in this context, may indeed prove of indispensable historical relevancy.

In the matter of participation in a full atomic war the whole issue becomes even more ambiguous, and most of the discussion to date has simply avoided the issues involved in this situation. The pacifist alternative is not a satisfying one, for weapons of mass destruction merely magnify the stakes involved in a very tenuous and agonized decision to renounce force and lay the self and others open to tyranny, at least temporarily. On the other hand, the challenge of the same weapons to the non-pacifist conscience lies in the fact that these weapons have so increased the fury of warfare that the cause of justice (even the cause of survival) can no longer be assured by recourse to it. There is no clear answer to this dilemma; the alternatives are dreadfully difficult, if not impossible, to defend either idealistically or pragmatically. Political decision (and to a large extent political analysis), in addition to the difficulty always present in the ideological problem discussed above, is rendered well nigh useless by a situation in which the alternatives are ineffectual resistance to tyranny and mass suicide. It is in such a situation that we stand naked before God, and face the ethical situation of man in its most stark and purest, and also its most awful, form. It is the situation in which the cultural jingo will die (and kill all his neighbors too) in sheer devotion to an ideal of freedom, but in which the Christian will understand more deeply than ever, regardless of the action which he takes, the need for justification by faith.

The beginning of wisdom in regard to the crisis of our age is not political shrewdness by provisional despair regarding the relevance of purely political ethics; the only hope of wisdom in an atomic holocaust is a framework of decision that transcends politics and understands obedience in a vertical dimension to a God in whose love and providence the tragedy of history is overcome and the actions of men redeemed.

STRATEGIES IN RACIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS*

By ALVIN W. ROSE

I

It is probably wise to begin the discussion of this rather broad area with some basic assumptions.

First, as to the ultimate objectives: I have reference to the ideals which the general society at least is committed to espouse, as well as to the more immediate objectives of action groups in race relations, even and particularly the objectives of this Institute.

Some years ago, Professor Wirth suggested that, in trying to understand a given system of racial and cultural relations, we should not fail to see the problem in terms of the hopes and aspirations of the respective minority groups themselves.¹ Dr. Wirth suggested four basic minority types: (a) the *secessionist*, i. e. the Zionists, Garveyites, etc., who wish to detach themselves completely from a given society for the purpose of establishing a separate socio-political order; (b) the *militant* minority type, i. e. the American communists, an essentially political group which seeks to replace the dominant group; (c) the *integrationists*, who wish at the very least a total social assimilation, a fusion of the subordinate and superordinate groups; and (d) the *pluralists*, who seek to achieve "an intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind without surrendering the variations of belief, culture and institutions which bestow upon mankind its richness and vigor."²

We shall assume the absence of the *secessionist* and the *militant* ideal among you;

* Read before the Second Annual Lutheran Race Relations Institute, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, August 1, 1951.

¹ See the chapter on this point by Louis Wirth in *The Science of Man in a World*, Ralph Linton, Editor, New York.

² Ruth Nanda Anshen, Ed. *Our Emergent Civilization*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 297.

we shall postulate the prevailing credo here to be at least that of the *integrationist*; really we shall hope your objective to be the pluralistic society that "blossoms into myriad forms of art and style and taste and mode of living. And yet, as it grows and ramifies and diversifies, it still remains one inclusive culture, the expressive tradition of the greater folk."³

To have a profitable discussion about strategies in racial relations, there should also exist among us some consensus as to the significant factors in the social matrix which must be changed. What factors should we tackle?

Some two years ago, Mr. Walter Coutou offered a new word, "tinsit".⁴ The one central fact about we human beings, Mr. Coutou suggested, is that severally and collectively, we tend to act in a particular way depending on our definition of the situation in which we happen to find ourselves. *Tendency* to act in a given *situation*. "T" for *tendency*: "in"; and "sit" for *situation*. Thus the concept "tinsit" denoting the *individual* and the *situation* in interaction as the prime factors in social behavior.

Similarly, Mr. Merton once suggested a fourfold framework in terms of which racial strategy might be conceived.⁵ Some of us are relatively free of racial prejudice and do not discriminate in any social situation.

Others of us are unprejudiced but, because of particular situations in which we sometimes find ourselves, discriminate.

³ Robert MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950, p. 115.

⁴ Walter Coutou, *Emergent Human Nature*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1949.

⁵ The basic theory underlying Merton's suggestions here are reported in "Social Structure and Anomie," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, Vol. III, p. 672.

II

During the past few months I have been talking with the president of a large department store in a border city. I am convinced that, in his racial feelings, he is nearly emancipated: but he is afraid that the community, his customers, would not affirm the employing of a Negro clerk.

Then, there are some of us who harbor severe racial prejudice but, because of the situation, do not discriminate.

Still others of us are genuinely prejudiced and consistently discriminate.

I suspect you will find Mr. Merton's chart of these individual and situational factors pregnant with ideas of strategy in race relations. And so we shall assume, secondly, that whether the object of our efforts be a senator, a church, a labor union, a local school board, or newspaper editor, we have always to consider, and consider well, the *actor* and the *situational field*, as he sees it, in which he is having to act.

In the third place, it will be helpful if we assume some distinction between methods and techniques.

The underlying orientation, the theoretical approach, the rationale, the design, the perspective, the frame of reference—these denote pretty well what we mean by "method". Methods, thus conceived, are but a step removed from, if not identical with, scientific principles; they comprise, or should comprise, the relatively constant maxims in planning social action as well as in analysis.

It is primarily in the sense of these underlying generalizations about race relations that we shall think of strategies.

On the other hand, we mean by techniques the battery of skills, each employed opportunistically, through which strategies are implemented. That little consideration is given these techniques in this discussion is only to imply that they require more attention than is here possible.

A few months ago, I was having dinner with a distinguished physician of Chicago, a Negro, aboard a train enroute from Chicago to Nashville, Tennessee. Throughout the dinner hour, a gentleman, a white man, was seated directly across the aisle. He stared at us painfully. With his eyes he told us how bitterly he hated us and all other Negroes. Though my friend and I were continuously aware of him, the only comment about him, as I remember, came from the physician who said to me softly: "Our friend across the aisle seems tragically disturbed at our presence"

Perhaps he was a native of the Deep South: perhaps he had seen a modicum of social equality here in Chicago. And he was going back home, now—"full".

I think my attitude toward him faded from one of pity into one of disdain. For while waiting for our apple pie and coffee, I met the white gentleman's stare with my own eyes as unflinchingly and as courageously as I could. I did not "give" with my countenance. And he became enraged. Half out of his chair and in a voice audible to everyone in the diner, he disparaged me: "you black (It was what President Truman is alleged to have called Drew Pearson).

Well, I didn't resent being called "black", for I am. But I am not that other thing he called me.

What did I do? Everyone in the diner for the moment was watching me, wondering what I was going to do.

Very quickly, firmly and yet privately, my physician friend advised: "Look at me, Rose. Ignore the fool, Rose. Look at me, Rose!!" And I looked at my physician friend. And I said nothing.

Now, I am sure and you will agree that, in this situation I should not have retaliated with similar lack of good taste. But the point I wish to make is that neither should I have said nothing. Here was a crisis situation in race relations, a crucial learning

situation not only for the gentleman across the aisle, but perhaps for everyone in the diner, a time, you see, when racial attitudes, whatever they were, were either to be validated, remain fluid and amorphous or positively changed. No, I should not have remained silent. I should have had at my tongue's tip an appropriate response that would have been an educational experience in race relations for everyone who would hear.

It is my judgment that a significant strategy in racial and cultural relations is the determination and dissemination of appropriate responses to make in crisis situations.

The research and planning that we have now developed on this strategy, largely to the credit of the American Jewish Congress, makes possible a very real community-wide participation in a constructive program of race relations.⁶ It is my understanding that in our small conference groups here there will be the opportunity to explore this strategy in more detail.

III

In whatever section of this nation one happens to be, he is struck with the fact of a kind of mental buffer zone between Negroes and whites, a mental isolation or, as we say, a social distance which the respective races display. Now, it is important to see that, behind these walls and except for the plenipotentiaries who conduct the affairs between the Negroes and whites, the upper-class American Negro, by and large, has faded from public view. The Negroes whom white people know in my state, for example, are for the most part those who are their maids and butlers and with whom there still exists a master-servant relationship. The Negro professional and business leaders, because their clients are largely

Negro, are practically unknown to the masses of whites. You can see that this situation produces a kind of "sampling error" which "proves" and confirms many anti-minority stereotypes.

On the other hand, you may be surprised to learn that a public appearance among Negroes in almost any Southern community of Lillian Smith, or any other Southern leader of known liberal views, is still a considerable occasion. Such people still draw crowds, I take it, because *inter alia*, such white people are still widely regarded by Negroes as quite few, exceptional and almost queer.

The second strategy that I should like to suggest, therefore, is manifest: in the hundreds of communities represented here, *efforts should be made to exhibit to each race the kind of representatives of the other race who are desirable models.*

I consider it important that this strategy be operative also beyond the limits of personal contacts. It should extend into the areas of motion pictures, radio programs, television, advertising and other media of mass communications.

But there is a little postscript that I should like to append to this strategy. I remember a friend, a Negro, in Houston, Texas, telling of a visit that a famous Negro soprano paid Texas a few years ago. Apparently, some few hundred wealthy white Texans had organized a music and fine arts club. Each year they invited from New York, artists for private concerts. This internationally-known soprano appeared for them one year. The next day after the concert, when she was doing some shopping in a downtown Houston store, one of the store clerks escorted her to the door and pointed to another store some two blocks away, and said: "They'd appreciate your trade. We don't cater to Niggers".

At this point, the owner of the store saw the soprano and rushed to her telling her how much he had enjoyed her concert the previous evening and wanting to know if there was anything—just anything at all—

⁶ Abraham Citron and John Harding, "An Experiment in Training Volunteers to Answer Anti-Minority Remarks," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, April, 1950, pp. 310-328. A bibliography of much of the work is on this strategy and may also be found in this reference.

that he could do for her. "Yes", she said. "Yes, there is one thing you can do. You can teach this young lady how to treat people courteously!!" Whereupon in sincere anger and hurt, the owner turned on the young clerk: "Don't you know this is Miss, one of the finest soprano's in America, that you have insulted? Go to my office at once!!!" And turning to the artist, he apologized: "I'm terribly sorry, she didn't know who you were!!"

My postscript, therefore, is that the suggestion of displaying the model leaders of both groups is not to essay for them a privileged role, for until all peoples are free, none can really be free.

IV

There is at present considerable support and much frenzied activity in America, in behalf of racial equality within the framework of segregation. It still surprises many people to learn that a large segment of Negro leadership embraces such a program.

Some few years ago several educational leaders were assembled at Fisk University to discuss the proposal of southern Governors for regional schools on a segregated basis. One of the panel participants, a Negro who is president of a leading Negro college, very passionately defended the system of segregated education for the reasons, first, that "Negro students from our elementary and high schools are not ready to compete with white children" and, secondly, "what we teachers have to realize is that we have our jobs to protect."

I remember very vividly in this meeting that the late Mr. Embree, who was seated in the audience mid-way the room, rose to his feet and interrupted this Negro college president: "Ladies and Gentlemen", Dr. Embree said, "I am sorry to interrupt this gentleman. But I am full—up to my neck!! I can remain quiet no longer. All of you know that I have given the greater part of my life to destroy the very segregation that this gentleman so passionately defends. Never before have I heard a Negro so val-

antly defend it. Now I should like to know how widespread among Negro leaders are the sentiments of this gentleman. For, if Negroes do not want first class citizenship, I for one should like now to close my briefcase and go home!!!"

I suppose the room was silent for at least three minutes. Dr. Embree, somehow, had lain bare the full tragedy of a segregated system long endured; it captures the consent of oppressed and oppressor alike, and the most literate of either side may pervert their own integrity to rationalize its existence.

In my southland, and, in fact, throughout America, our schools, churches, transportation facilities and other social services are being aborted through millions of dollars now being invested in a segregated society.

While the courts happily are coming to view segregation as an evil, malum in se, I should like therefore to suggest as a strategy, thirdly, that segregation and equality are incompatible; one can not be maintained with the hope also of having the other.

V

Some ten years ago, a lumber manufacturer in the southern district of Georgia was indicted for employing workers at below minimum wage levels and beyond maximum hour limits, in violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act passed by Congress in 1938.⁷ The industrialist admitted the charges, but contended there was nothing the federal government could do about it because, he argued, it was the exclusive right of the state of Georgia, if it saw fit, to regulate his establishment, and the federal government was powerless under the constitution to intervene into the affairs of Georgia.

The Supreme Court overruled this argument, declaring that in protecting the welfare of its citizens the federal government

⁷ United States vs. Darby, 321 U. S. 100; 132 A. L. R. 1430.

"may choose any means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control of intra-state activities".

On April 24, 1950, the California Appellate Court held that an Alien Land Law of 1920, restricting the land ownership rights of Japanese-Americans, was in violation of the United Nations Charter.⁸ For the first time in the history of this nation, a law of the world was invoked to protect the rights of minorities within America.

As the power of control gives way from hamlet to county, from county to state, from state to nation and from nation to "The Great Society", government correspondingly becomes equalitarian. There is a significant correlation between the guarantee of human rights and the emergence of the larger society.

I should like, therefore, to suggest, finally, the generalization that the larger the scope of centralized control, the more minority groups have to gain.

VI

These brief observations on strategies in racial and cultural relations are per force illustrative rather than exhaustive. The problem is multi-dimensional and so have been the approaches of social science. I suspect my colleagues in sociology would not even classify these remarks as sociological, nor will you as professional religionists view them as orthodox precepts of theology. Somewhere in the tangent penumbrae of these two disciplines there lies a hiatus that ought to be bridged in order to translate systematic knowledge into common understanding and acceptance.

Social science has contributed little to such a rapprochement, in large part because it has viewed such a mission repugnant to its essential purpose.

On the other hand, the church, with its doctrinal wrappings, has never allowed re-

ligion to shine very brightly. The true gold of religion has too often remained locked away in the worn out purse which contained it. The prospects for democracy—the socio-political expression of the Christian ideal—would be far brighter were the Christian church really to embrace it and show the way toward the brotherhood of man.

You may remember the closing words of Wells in his *Outline of History*: "The old loyalties, the old too limited and narrow political and social assumptions, the old too elaborate religious formulae, have lost their power of conviction, and the greater ideas of a world state . . . have been winning their way only very slowly to recognition. . . . But out of the trouble and tragedy of this present time may emerge a moral revival, a religious revival, of a simplicity and scope to draw together men of alien races and now discrete traditions into one sustained way of living for the world's service. Religious emotion—stripped of corruptions and freed from its last priestly entanglements—may presently blow through life again like a great wind, bursting the doors and flinging open the shutters of the individual life, and making many things possible and easy that in these present days of exhaustion seem almost too difficult to desire."⁹

Somewhere in the Gospel, St. John declares, "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil." I suspect Miss Anshen is near the truth when she observes that it has not been so much the atomizing influence of science as it has been the weakness and atrophy of morality, ethics and religion which contain our troubles. A positive religious program of action in race relations, grounded in sound sociological principles and strategies, it seems to me, would go far in facilitating the kind of religious survival that Mr. Wells describes.

⁸ Sei Fujii v. State, Second Series, 218 Pacific 595.

⁹ H. G. Wells, *An Outline of History*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1920, p. 1293.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRIST AND CULTURE. By H. Richard Niebuhr. New York: Harper, 1951, 259 and x pp. \$3.50.

Richard Niebuhr's books appear less frequently than one would wish but when he does publish a book it always has a quality that suggests to me a kind of perfection. One feels that he has brooded over the materials for many years, that he has lived so closely with the thinkers about whom he writes that he knows them with the kind of sympathy that accompanies friendship. The result of this process is that he is always fair in dealing with every point of view that he examines. This book is organized around several types of Christian thinking about the relationship between Christ and culture but the author never treats any individual thinker as merely the representative of a type. He makes the reader fully aware in each case how far the man whom he has chosen to represent the type diverges from it. He has an extraordinary gift for seeing what is true in another man's thought however much he may differ from him in outlook and conviction. I have always thought that Richard Niebuhr's *The Meaning of Revelation* was one of the most original and also one of the most beautiful books written by any modern theologian. This volume (except for the last chapter) has in addition a degree of clarity that the earlier book lacks.

The structure of this book grows out of a fivefold classification of types of Christian thinking about the relation of Christ to culture. At opposite extremes there are those who stress the conflict between Christ and culture (Tertullian and Tolstoy), those who identify Christ with culture (Gnosticism and modern liberalism of which Ritschl is taken as representative). Between those extremes there are three positions which are more inclusive than either extreme though they differ profoundly from one another. The first of

these thinks of Christ as the fulfillment of culture but without losing the distinctiveness of Christ (Clement of Alexandria and Thomas Aquinas). The second of these types is called "dualistic" and the author discusses Paul and Marcion but especially Luther in this connection. The third of these types thinks of Christ as the "transformer of culture" and here Augustine and F. D. Maurice are emphasized. A book planned in this way provides a remarkable panorama of Christian social ethics. The author uses "culture" very broadly to refer to "that total process of human activity and that total result of such activity to which now the name *culture*, now the name *civilization*, is applied in common speech."

It is impossible to suggest the richness of the analysis of each one of the thinkers discussed. In fact there are many others who receive attention by the way. The first chapter has one of the finest statements of the manysidedness of the meaning of Christ that I have ever read. The significant result that comes out of this book is that every one of the five Christian types make a positive contribution. I suspect that the author feels more at home with Luther and Augustine than with any of the others but he sees where both are weak. Each chapter includes a very careful sorting out of the elements of strength and weakness in the position discussed. I hope that this book will be very widely read in both this country and in Europe for the divisions of opinion that have emerged in the contemporary Church are very closely related to the issue of Christ and Culture. Our contemporary theologians should learn much from Professor Niebuhr about what is true in the positions which they reject without fully understanding them.

The last chapter in this book is an anticlimax. Instead of putting together what he has helped his readers to learn from the five types studied he allows Kierkegaard to

come in between him and those types. He falls back into a kind of diffident indecision which is remote from the spirit of the other chapters. He is able to say in the earlier chapters where each of the thinkers whom he discusses is right or wrong. Not that he becomes an arrogant judge of all five types but a real pattern seems to emerge out of his criticisms. Instead of helping the reader to see that pattern better the concluding chapter obscures it. There may be a positive value in this if it prevents the reader from finding in the book a sixth position, the author's synthesis, instead of continuing to go back over the dialogue between the five types which are described and taking part in that dialogue for himself. Perhaps that is really what the final chapter is trying to say.

JOHN C. BENNETT

THE HERITAGE OF THE REFORMATION. *Edited by Elmer J. F. Arndt.* New York: Richard R. Smith Inc., 1950. 264 pp. \$3.

The faculty of Eden Theological Seminary have observed the centennial of their school by joining in a volume which attempts to relate the distinctive heritage of their faith to the modern world—particularly in terms of the ecumenical movement. The twelve essays which comprise the book are written by nine members of the active faculty, the past president, Dr. Samuel D. Press, and by Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, the former a one-time professor at Eden and the latter a member of the board of trustees.

Symposia as a rule are awkward productions because of the unevenness which is inevitable when a group attempts to relate its own common concern with a specific issue and the individual talents and interests of diverse personalities. *The Heritage of the Reformation* does very well as symposia go, even though the essays are not equal in quality. The unifying concern is clearer in this book than it is in many of its general type, and the way most of the

contributors have approached their fields of special interest in the light of the common enterprise indicates a genuine community of the spirit.

If the common theme is to receive further elaboration it should be put as follows: The ecumenical movement today is the bearer in the 20th century of the genius of the Reformation—that movement in the 16th century which epitomizes the continual task an effective Christianity must face in rediscovering its own mission in terms of an adequate Biblical theology. In nearly every instance the authors of the essays have recognized the theme in these terms and have emphasized its significance.

After an introduction by Dr. Arndt, the book begins with a discussion of the central Protestant emphasis by Dr. Allen G. Wehrli. The other essays in turn deal with the following subjects—the Word of God, by Herbert H. Wernecke; the essentials of Biblical theology, by Allen O. Miller; the centrality of Christ, by Dr. Press; the place of the sacraments, by Dr. Arndt; the role of preaching, by the current president, Dr. Frederick W. Schroeder; liturgical form and freedom, by Purd E. Deitz; the significance of prayer, by John Biegeleisen; the relationship to Christian education, by Harold A. Pflug; the problem in the area of ethics, by Richard Niebuhr; the ecumenical movement as such, by Carl E. Schneider; and a summarizing essay on the contemporary relevance of the Reformation, by Reinhold Niebuhr.

In such a book it is hard to single out any specific essay for mention, yet some comment ought to be given to Dr. Richard Niebuhr's description of the dialectical encounter of what he terms the conservative spirit of "Protestant" morality, with its essentially negative and history-denying implications, against the progressive and dynamic "Reformation" ethic with its affirmation of the significance of history. While some readers will question with justice Prof. Niebuhr's restrictive use of the terms "Protestant" and "Reformation" as being historically unjust to what western

culture has come to see in those terms, the underlying issue is ably put.

Prof. Arndt's appreciation of the relationship of the great Reformation doctrine of Justification by Faith to the functional validity of the sacramental side of Christianity is very well done. If anyone wants a re-statement of Justification by Faith as the most distinctive element of Reformation religion, transcending the Priesthood of all Believers in significance, and thoroughly relevant as the cornerstone of religion in this confused era, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr's essay will provide it.

Dr. Allen Miller has done an interesting job in describing the Reformation emphasis under the three headings of Revelation theology, Covenant theology, and Trinitarian theology. Dr. Wehrli's essay, at the very outset, points to the positive, re-affirming, creative note in Reformation thinking, as against the traditional view of seeing the primarily negative aspects of the movement.

If this reviewer has any serious misgivings about the value of this volume, it is because the authors fail to relate their subject-matter adequately to the modern world except through the ecumenical movement. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr's essay, and also that of his brother, are exceptions. While the ecumenical movement is a tremendously challenging development in modern Christianity, its significance cannot be divorced from the cultural upheaval of our times. The genius of the Reformation is, and always will be, its capacity to rediscover a dynamic Christianity in times of cultural revolution. The authors have seen this to some extent, but their theme has greater possibilities than they have recorded.

CHARLES D. KEAN

JOHN WESLEY'S JOURNAL. *As Abridged by Nehemiah Curnock.* New York: The Philosophical Library, 1951. 433 pp.

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ley's *Journal*. This is a good addition to the current publications in early Methodism. The editors have included a larger proportion of the early chapters of the *Journal* than from the latter part, intending to make available the record of Methodist origins.

The redeeming and reforming doctrines and activities of the Methodists in eighteenth-century England are not less significant for the Anglo-Saxon world than the "heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers." Wesley's *Journal* impresses one to the point of fatigue with its picture of endless activity to redeem the world. Preaching, debating, organizing, writing, travelling, purging the ranks of the societies, contending with angry mobs, collecting money for meeting houses and schools and to relieve the poor and the ill—such is the theme of the pages of his daily record. Above all, Wesley was always the preacher. At one point he exclaims, "I do indeed live by preaching!" He preached three times a day to thousands all over England, Scotland and Ireland and maintained this pace till he was an old man. His working day began at five o'clock in the morning. At the age of eighty-two he bemoans the fact that if he works at the job of reading and editing his papers for more than thirteen hours per day, his eyes bother him!

Wesley says when he is past middle age, "If I might choose, I should still (as I have done hitherto) preach the Gospel to the poor." His *Journal* reveals his persistent concern that the Gospel reach the laborer, the poor, the prisoner—the people in British society who were in fact lost to the Church. He records the progress of the moral reawakening of the poor. One does not of course, find in Wesley's *Journal* any consistent and systematic dealing with social and economic justice such as the Church has developed since his time, but neither is Wesley's movement unconcerned about the conditions of life at the time. He has genuine sympathy with the poor and not only develops a notable interest among Methodists in philanthropy, but the *Journal*

contains many particular questions about the operation of justice in democracy. Perhaps the greatest contribution Wesley's movement made to the development of democracy in England was the self-respect and the self-consciousness of common people which are evident in his record of the movement. Apparently, however, there was little democracy in the actual functioning of the Methodist societies. Wesley maintained rigid personal control over local societies, ministers, and even over individual Christians, till his death.

It is interesting to note the place given by the editors to Wesley's doctrine of perfection. This edition omits the most important references in the *Journal* to what Wesley called his "good doctrine of Christian perfection." Omitted are the references which describe and define the doctrine. The one important reference included in this edition shows Wesley raising some question about the claims of two persons to be "saved from all sin." The doctrine of perfection is too important in current theological thinking to omit from this picture of early Methodism. Wesley is one of the important representatives of the doctrine and makes one of the most attractive statements of it in the standard edition of his *Journal*, as well as in his published sermons and in his work, *Christian Perfection*. It would seem almost as if the omission of "perfectionist" passages were an attempt to bring Wesley more nearly into line with current theological developments. But Curnock's abridgement antedated these developments.

Wesley's interests were broad and his intellectual curiosity considerable. His personal judgments on all kinds of subjects and events are notable for their soundness, but many limitations are evident too. For instance, he insists on rigid conformity with the rules of the Kingswood School that "children should never play." At a number of points Wesley condemns what he calls "modern music" in the Church. He predicts that it will not last, especially the practice of "singing the same words ten

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times over; . . . and singing different words by different persons, at one and the same time." Electricity interested Wesley; He wrote a pamphlet on the subject. Strangely enough, his major interest in electricity seemed to be the possible medical uses of it. He recommended its wide usefulness in the treatment of practically all kinds of ailments. He was himself "electrified" on numerous occasions for lameness. In the light of history, his judgment on the American Revolution is now only humorous. He wrote in his *Journal* on August 1, 1777, that he "desired as many as could to join together in fasting and prayer, that God would restore the spirit of love and of a sound mind, to the poor deluded rebels in America."

Wesley's *Journal* is not only interesting, but it also contains many inspirational passages, passages which recall us to our Christian vocation. Wesley has a message for present-day Methodists and the rest of us who may have become respectable and moved up town.

D. B. ROBERTSON

THE DISENCHANTED. By Budd Schulberg. New York: Random House, 1950.

THE FAR SIDE OF PARADISE. By Arthur Mizener. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

There is a deep and distressing pathos in the current revival of interest in the novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald. The pathos is so uncomfortable in the fact that our sixth decade in the Century of Progress should decide to revive a novelist whose claim to fame lies mainly in his description of that sadly empty third decade, the twenties. Fitzgerald was The Party-Party Boy of that era, and his writings merely glorify the shallowness and emptiness just as his own personal development points it out autobiographically.

Mizener in his book which paraphrases in title at least of the first of Fitzgerald's novels writes both a biography of the perennial Princetonian but also makes an

analysis of the man as artist. He claims that his boyhood idolwriter can rest in peace because he established himself as a serious author and future generations will be able to study him as a sort of classic. There be many, however, who will insist that Fitzgerald must remain in the class of those who are best qualified to write clever and readable stories for the Saturday Evening Post or Colliers or Ladies' Home Journal. They will be easily read best by the office secretary in the moments while she is allowing her bright red finger nail polish to dry. Ah, not quite as this, to be sure, but there will be many who will see in these novels and short stories nothing else than the brittle romantic, the day dreaming about bright and handsome people flitting into big homes or ornate hotel lobbies to begin silly drunken parties. Later they will strip off their clothes in abandon and fall into the waves of the Long Island waters.

This is surely not to say that the novel must have a "social point of view" as the fourth and fifth decades of our century were apt to insist. The novel need not be a revamped copy of Dickens' *Oliver Twist* nor yet even of Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*. But it is not unfair to expect that it will have some body and character beyond the sort of thing Fitzgerald wrote. Even if he is the herald of his age, and his age was empty, there could be a greater depth to the art than many can see in Fitzgerald. Surely Hemingway was also creating a deeper art in the same period.

Mizener, however, in his biographical study has a sort of school boy adoration still for Fitzgerald. He only pities the man's inability to rise above the appetitive drives which ended in dipsomania for the man and insanity for his wife. He continues, however, to press for a favorable decision for this man whose art floundered because he so closely identified himself with the generation when he lived and did his producing. His age judged *This Side of Paradise* and *The Great Gatsby* as wonderful: but his age also judged the silly

and the ridiculous and the shallow as wonderful. *Requiescat in pace!*


Budd Schulberg was personally closely associated with Fitzgerald in the later days. It was he who accompanied Fitzgerald on the infamous lost week-end at Dartmouth. His book, *The Disenchanted*, is mainly the story with effective flashbacks of this visit to the Ice Carnival. There is much that is unconvincing about this story told by Schulberg, but much that is all too realistic. Here is man conceived in the time of the end of an era, who came to maturity in a period of war, who was in the flush of success in the time of wild "prosperity" and who died in the time of depression. The earlier author tells his life story between bottles on this last lost week end. And then he dies.

There is indeed a terrible pathos about a life story which is so tragic. But the deeper pathos is that our generation must now be asked to participate in a revival of interest in the novels-of-shalowness of this empty period. There must be some middle ground between this and the simple YMCA "let-us-then-be-up-and-doing" mentality.

ADOLPH BEHRENBURG

EXPERIMENTS OF SPIRITUAL LIFE AND HEALTH. By Roger Williams. Edited with a Historical Introduction by Winthrop S. Hudson. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951. 103 pp. \$2.00.

This little book is especially useful in that it makes unforgettably clear a fact that those who deal with Williams often forget, that "actually, Roger Williams was the most other worldly of all the New Englanders" (p. 12). Professor Hudson's penetrating introduction sets Williams squarely in his proper context as "a Puritan of the Puritans." What distinguished him from his fellow New Englanders was "... not a disagreement on fundamental presuppositions but the singleness of devotion with which he pursued the implications of assumptions common to them all" (p. 12).



The introductory generalizations are clearly illustrated by Williams' own words in his spiritual directory, "Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health," here presented in readily usable form with spelling modernized, typographical errors corrected, punctuation altered to conform to present standards, and titles of major divisions inserted. But there is more than historical interest in this writing, for it is truly a devotional classic, at once profoundly religious and realistically tough-minded. Though parts of it may seem to speak largely to another age, there is throughout a surprising relevance for modern Christians and modern seekers. Those whose interest in Williams is primarily as a proponent of religious liberty will understand him the better if they know him too as the author of the "Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health."

ROBERT T. HANDY

THE MYSTERIOUS NUMBERS OF THE BOOK OF KINGS. A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE KINGS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH. By Edwin R. Thiele. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.

In a day when the word "history" is used with great freedom and confused meanings, and we are told that all that is needed is a "sense of history", evidently without any knowledge of the facts, a book dealing with dates might appear to be not only irrelevant

but boring. *Chronos* has been losing ground to *kairos*. What the relation of *chronos* to *kairos* is, however is not always made clear. It is important to point out that Scripture emphasizes both and that the one achieves its meaning and force by a recognition of the other. Professor Thiele knows that chronology is the framework of history, that no scientific history is possible without chronology, and that the Bible is itself an eloquent witness to the importance of precise dating. He writes as an historian and with remarkable lucidity. He shows an earnest regard for the testimony of the biblical records. What is more, his book makes fascinating reading. Above all, it is the work of a scholar who knows how to deal with problems of great complexity in an objective, orderly, and forceful way.

The problems of biblical chronology are ancient. The translators of the Septuagint were conscious of them and obviously attempted to "improve" matters. Josephus tried to reconcile what he believed to be discrepancies and inconsistencies. In later times Archbishop Ussher received a questionable immortality by the usage of his chronology in the King James version. Many modern scholars have devoted their efforts to solve the problems, some of them surrendering the accuracy of the biblical text, others subjecting the data to radical revision. The surprising result of Professor Thiele's acute and scholarly investigation is that the dates of the kings stand up exceedingly well.

In a way the difficulties of the chronology of the reigns of Israel's kings are enhanced by the large amount of material available. If we had less information, they would not be so great. The problem is not only to explain the number of years assigned to each reign but to reconcile discrepant reports. Professor Begrich in his well-known doctoral dissertation discovered no less than five different chronological systems. The merit of Thiele's solution is its relative simplicity. He studies the points from which the reigns of kings were dated (by no means always the same), the different calendar years, the shifts in usage from one system to another, and the varying practices of the northern and southern kingdoms. He adduces the evidence of extra-biblical data by citing the actual records, e.g. the Assyrian eponym list and the Ptolemaic canon. He employs the "fixed dates" of the Battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C., the invasion of Sennacherib in 701 B.C., and others for his purposes. On the basis of what is in general fairly ample data he recognizes the presence of a number of co-regencies and gives up completely the existence of interregna, the favorite device of his predecessors to account for apparent contradictions.

This is not the place to raise critical questions. But it gives one the opportunity to call attention to a book of considerable importance for the study of the Bible. For all who take the history of Israel seriously—and what history is there which should be taken more seriously?—this book is indispensable.

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